Abstract: Theory does not predict an unambiguous relationship between a country's financial and legal institutions and firm size. Using data on the largest industrial firms for 44 countries, we find that firm size is positively related to financial intermediary development, and the efficiency of the legal system. We do not find any evidence that firms are larger in order to internalize the functions of the banking system or to compensate for the general inefficiency of the legal system. Financial development allows firms to operate on a larger scale by facilitating access to external finance and a more efficient asset allocation.
Introduction
A rapidly growing literature, originating with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, henceforth LLSV) , has demonstrated the importance of the legal system and financial institutions for firms' financial decisions, such as capital structure and dividend policy. 1 For the most part, this literature treats firm size as given. However, financial intermediaries and the legal system provide an alternative way of accomplishing some of the key functions that the firm accomplishes internally: the mobilization of resources for investment, the monitoring of performance, and resolution of conflicts of interest among different parties. As a result, the equilibrium size of firms might also depend on the development of these institutions in each country. In this paper, we investigate empirically the relation of firm size and the development of financial and legal institutions across countries.
The corporate finance literature suggests that financial and legal institutions could affect firm size in opposing ways. In countries with underdeveloped financial and legal systems, large firms' internal capital markets are likely to be more effective at allocating capital and monitoring individual investment projects than the public markets and financial institutions. Along these lines, Almedia and Wolfenzon (2003) provide a theoretical model of the relation between the scope of firms and the level of investor protection in an economy and the allocative efficiency of public capital markets. Given the differences in relative efficiency, firms in countries with weak legal and financial systems may have an incentive to substitute internal capital markets for public markets. This substitution would suggest an inverse relation between firm size and the development of a country's legal and financial institutions.
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There may also be another opposing effect at work. Large firms are also subject to agency problems. Their size and complexity makes expropriation by firms' insiders difficult to monitor and control by outside investors. Thus, investors in large firms may require strong financial institutions and effective legal systems to control expropriation by corporate insiders.
These considerations suggest that the optimal size of firms may be positively related to the quality of a country's legal system and financial institutions. Thus, the relationship between firm size and institutional development is likely to depend on the relative importance of these two effects.
To test which of these opposing effects is more dominant, we need to focus on a sample of firms that are able to choose their boundaries and determine their size without significant constraints. However, several papers in the literature suggest that in countries with less developed legal and financial systems, firms' growth is constrained particularly by their ability to obtain external finance (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005) . If firms are constrained in their ability to grow and reach their optimal size due to access issues, the above trade-offs would be blurred. For example, even if underdeveloped institutions make it optimal for a firm to substitute internal markets for public markets and thus become large, financing constraints may prevent it from growing, confounding this relationship. Thus, in this paper we focus on the largest firms across countries, which the literature has shown to be the least constrained in reaching their optimal size.
We investigate empirically the relation between firm size and the development of financial and legal institutions in 44 countries, using information from financial statements on up to 100 largest industrial firms in each country. We find that there exists a positive relation 5 between the level of development of a country's financial system and firm size, even after controlling for the size of the economy and national income per capita. Development of financial institutions and higher capitalization of stock markets are associated with larger firm size.
We also find a significant relation between the characteristics of a country's legal system and firm size. Firms are larger in countries with more efficient judicial systems and contract enforcement. The relation between financial and legal institutions and firm size is robust to taking into account potential multicollinearity between these variables. We also find evidence of positive relations between firm size and strong property rights protection and the absence of corruption, although these results are more sensitive to differences in specification.
Our results also indicate that firms in industries with a higher need for external financing are larger in countries with more developed financial institutions. Furthermore, firms in industries with a higher "natural" ratio of intangible to fixed assets are larger in countries with more developed financial institutions. Overall, these results indicate that financial development fosters larger firms by allowing better access to finance and a more efficient asset allocation.
Our paper is related to the newly emerging literature on the role of financial and legal institutions on firm performance. LLSV (1997, 1998) , Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that developed financial systems and the efficient enforcement of laws facilitate external funding of firms. These papers take the distribution of firm size as exogenous. By contrast, we allow for the possibility that firm organization may adjust in response to the level of development of institutions and show that firm size increases with both the development of the financial sector and more efficient enforcement of laws.
Our paper is also related to two recent papers by Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2001) and Cetorelli (2002) . While Kumar, Rajan and Zingales also examine the determinants of firm size 6 across countries, their approach statistically infers firm sizes in different countries from aggregate industry data in each country. By contrast, we obtain our data from financial reports.
Cetorelli (2002) uses industry-level data for 17 OECD countries to assess the effect of bank concentration on industrial concentration. He, however, uses the average firm size for an industry rather than firm-level data, as we do.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the hypotheses that we test. Section 3 discusses the data and our empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 concludes. Data sources are discussed in the Appendix.
Motivation
The key question in analyzing institutional determinants of firm size was posed by Coase (1937) : "Why does the boundary of the firm and the market fall where it does?" Coase argued that certain productive tasks are optimally done within firms, where actions of subordinate managers can be optimally monitored, but that with increasing size firms become inefficient. As a firm grows, there comes a point where it reaches equilibrium size where the marginal intra-firm and market transaction costs are equal. The equilibrium size for each firm depends on its organizational capital, or in the case of entrepreneurial firms, on the abilities of the entrepreneur (Lucas (1978) , Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) , Almeida and Wolfenzon (2003) ). However, little is known about how the functioning of financial institutions and legal systems in a country affects the balance between intra-firm and market transaction costs and thus how the equilibrium firm size varies across countries. We next examine how such an impact could arise.
a. Internal Monitoring, Access to Capital and Firm Size
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There are at least two ways that the state of a country's financial and legal institutions can determine whether it is more efficient to organize an activity as a small stand-alone firm, or as a unit of larger firm.
2 At the project level, depending on the state of country's financial and legal institutions, it may be more efficient to monitor projects internally in a firm rather than using the capital market. At the firm level, the magnitude of agency costs and access to capital markets may also depend on the size.
A firm's internal capital allocation process may function more efficiently than a public capital market. Firms are hierarchies, and senior managers can command managers in charge of a project to produce information, and provide finely calibrated incentive schemes. In the event it becomes necessary, the firm's senior management can seize direct control of a non-performing unit and liquidate its assets. However, advantages to size might be offset if insiders of large firms can expropriate more investor wealth in countries with weak institutions. In this case, the low quality of external monitoring or the inability of external investors to prevent misappropriation acts as a cost to size.
A firm in a country with significant agency costs of size may mitigate those costs by, for example, remaining under family control, perhaps at the cost of reduced ability to fund large positive net present value investments. As a result, the negative relation between the equilibrium 8 size and the quality of a country's institutions will not hold if large firms' insiders have a sufficiently large comparative advantage in expropriating assets in countries with weak financial and legal systems. The foregoing discussion suggests that if external monitoring is more important in reducing dissipation in larger firms, then holding other variables constant, the equilibrium firm size is larger in countries with efficient legal systems and well-developed financial systems. According to this conjecture, the effect of financial and legal development is larger on intra-firm than on market transaction costs. Below, we empirically examine the relationship between firm size and development of financial and legal systems to see which effect is greater in magnitude.
There is little empirical evidence on how firm size affects the relation between quality of a country's financial institutions and the ability of managers to expropriate wealth. However, evidence on a related question, whether in multi-divisional firms, which are organized so that managers have discretion to shift funds across, divisions are subject to greater agency costs than single-division firms, suggests that there might exist a similar relation between weak external monitoring that permits managerial discretion and value dissipation. Early studies using U.S.
data by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that that when managers can allocate funds across industries in multi-divisional firms, the value of the firms declines relative to a single-segment firm benchmark. Comment and Jarrell (1995) 
b. Focus on Large Firms
Even if optimal firm size is larger in countries with underdeveloped legal and financial institutions, firms in developing countries may face financing obstacles that prevent them from reaching their optimal size. 6 These obstacles are higher for small firms than for large firms and the disparity is larger in countries with poor institutions (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) ). Thus, these financing obstacles have the potential of confounding estimates of the relation between desired firms size and a countries institutions. To minimize such confounding we focus on the largest firms in each country. 7 These firms are likely to be the least financially constrained in their economies. Furthermore, the tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of size outlined above are most likely to be material for the largest firms. Thus, investigating the size decisions of largest firms should provide a clearer test of the underlying trade-offs than a test based on average firm size.
c. Technology, the Market and Firm Size
While in this paper we are mainly interested in transaction cost, or institutional determinants of firm size (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) , optimal firm size can also depend on the firm's technology and on its market opportunities. 8 Thus, we include several of the factors identified in the literature as controls. The conventional microeconomic approach, also known as the technological approach, argues that firm size is determined by technical and allocational efficiency (Baumol et al., 1982; Panzar, 1989) . Following this literature, we expect capital intensity to be positively related to size and control for it by including firm level as well as industry and country variables. For example, GDP per capita has been used in literature to capture economy-wide capital intensity (Banjeri, 1978) .
While in both the institutional and technological theories of firm, firm size is determined by efficiency reasons, a contrasting view is that firm size is determined by its market power (Kitching, 1982) . Firm profitability, size of markets, as well as openness of economies are variables that can capture firms' actual and potential market power. Profits can reflect greater efficiency as well as market power. Size of the economy, its growth rate and its openness to trade can also have implications for market power and opportunities.
In our analysis we also control for indicators of a country's economic development, specifically its GDP per capita and the educational level of its population. These control variables reduce the risk that the institutional and legal variables we use are proxying for other factors that depend on a country's level of development. Richer economies should have larger firms, since potential entrepreneurs face higher opportunity costs in the form of higher wages 7 See, for example, LLSV (1999) on ownership concentration or Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 1999) on capital structure. 8 There are also stochastic theories of firm size which argue that the growth rate of a firm and its future size is independent of its current size and its past growth history (Gibrat's Law). However, the observed empirical relationship between firm size and growth, as well as the lack of explanation of the law for new entry and growth-age relationships indicate its limits. See You (1995) for a discussion of this and other theories of firm size.
11 (Lucas, 1978) . A higher level of human capital in an economy might either enable larger firms, due to higher managerial skills, or lead to more entry and thus smaller firms, due to more widespread entrepreneurial skills (Lucas, 1978; Rosen, 1982 and Kremer, 1993 ).
Below we use firm-level data for 44 countries to answer the following questions:
• Are the largest firms in countries with well-developed financial systems bigger or smaller than the largest firms in countries with less developed financial systems?
• Is there a positive or negative relation between firm size and the efficiency of the legal system?
• Are these relationships different in industries with a higher external financial need or higher ratio of intangible assets? Figure 1 shows that there is a wide variation in firm size across countries. However, annual average growth rates of these firms by country are very stable over our sample period. Nevertheless, in our sensitivity analysis we also restrict the sample to top 25 firms in each country to assure that these firms face minimum obstacles to their growth and are more or less unconstrained in determining their size.
Data and Methodology
While these data are the best available for purposes of cross-country comparison, they carry certain problems. First, in some countries the largest firms might not be included in Worldscope because they are not listed and therefore not obliged to submit financial information to the public. Second, our data do not allow us to ascertain that all large firms in a country are independent from each other; some of them might be related to each other through ownership links. We recognize these issues however believe that our results are interesting despite these concerns.
We use three firm-specific characteristics as control variables. We use Net Fixed Assets divided by Total Assets to explore whether the structure of a firm's assets can explain its size. A firm with a larger share of fixed assets in total assets has more collateral, thus larger borrowing power and should therefore be better able to expand its operation using external finance. A larger share of fixed assets might also indicate a larger capital intensity, which is predicted to result in larger firms. We use Net Sales to Net Fixed Assets as an additional variable to capture capital intensity and also to control for different financing patterns across firms. Specifically, firms with higher net sales relative to fixed assets might need more short-term financing to 13 support sales. Finally, we use Return on Assets to explore whether more profitable firms are also larger. As discussed above, profitability may be an indicator of market power.
Although the focus of the paper is on institutional determinants of firm size, we also use a broad array of economic indicators to control for influences predicted by different theories of firm size. The first group comprises variables that proxy for macroeconomic determinants of firm size. All these variables are available on a yearly basis and come from the World Development Indicators (WDI). The level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the overall size of the economy, and GDP per capita indicates the income level of countries; both are measured in constant U.S. dollars. The former is an indicator of market size and the latter can capture economy-wide capital intensity (Banjeri, 1978) . As indicated by the data in Tables 1 and   2 We use three indicators of the legal environment to explore whether the legal system of a country has an impact on the size of its firms. Recent research has shown the importance of the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts and the origin of the legal system for financial sector development, firm-growth and economic growth. Finally, we use two measures -CORRUPTION and PROPERTY RIGHTS -to explore the impact of the institutional environment beyond the financial and legal system on firm size.
CORRUPTION is a measure of lack of corruption in government, on a scale of zero to 6. Lower scores indicate that high government officials are likely to demand special and illegal payments.
It is available through International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). PROPERTY RIGHTS
captures the degree of legal protection of private property and the probability that the government will expropriate private property. The index ranges from one to 5 with higher values indicating better protection of property rights. It is available from the Heritage Foundation.
The correlations shown in Table 2 indicate that firms are significantly larger in larger and richer countries with higher secondary school enrollment rates. Firms are also significantly larger in countries where the banking system is larger, legal systems are more efficient, and property 16 rights are better protected. Many of the country-level variables, however, are also correlated with each other, underlining the importance of multiple regression analysis.
Methodology
To explore institutional determinants of firm size we use a cross-section of firm-level data, averaged over the sample period and including industry dummies. Our initial crosssectional regressions take the following form:
where SIZE is measured by total sales in constant U.S. dollars, FIRM is a set of firm characteristics, MACRO is an array of macro-economic variables, FINANCE is a vector of indicators of financial development, LEGAL a set of variables measuring the efficiency of the legal system, INST includes other institutional variables such as property rights protection and lack of corruption variables, and ζ is an industry dummy variable for industry k. We control for 20 different industries.
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While our sample includes almost 3,000 firms, we have only 44 degrees of freedom on the country-level, which might bias our estimates. To control for this, we use random countryeffects in our robustness analysis. We also test robustness of our results to clustering at the country and industry level, which allows for the errors of firms in a given country or industry to be correlated. Further, we interact the country-level variables of interest with industry indicators of dependence on external finance and reliance on intangible assets. This allows us to (i) exploit additional variation below the country-level and (ii) assess possible channels through which financial and legal institutions impact firm size across countries. 13 See Appendix Table A2 for the list of industries.
In order to ensure that our results are not influenced by omitted factors at the country level, we also do robustness tests of our results by including a large set of macroeconomic factors in the variable array MACRO. Further, the financial variables we use may themselves depend on the legal systems and protection of property rights. Thus, in our robustness tests we also investigate the impact of legal and institutional variables plus the additional impact of financial development not predicted by these variables. Also, we explore the sensitivity of our main results to an alternative definition of firm size, total assets in constant U.S. dollars. Finally, we restrict the sample size to top 25 firms, to control for the fact that some countries in our sample have fewer firms, and to ensure that we are focusing on firms with minimal growth obstacles. Table III shows that a country's institutions predict the size of its largest firms. In Columns (1) to (7), we examine the impact of each financial, legal and other institutional variables separately.
The Results
Financial and Legal Institutions and Firm Size
Insert Table III here
The results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table III suggest that firms are larger in countries with better developed banking systems and stock markets. Both PRIVATE CREDIT and MARKET CAPITALIZATION have a significant and positive impact on firm size consistent with the hypothesis that firm size is larger in countries with well-developed financial intermediaries and markets.
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The relation between financial institutions and firm size is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. Take the example of Turkey. The regression result in column 5 suggests that if Turkey (PRIVATE CREDIT = 0.14) had the same level of financial intermediary development as Korea (PRIVATE CREDIT = 1.06), average firm size of the largest firms in Turkey would have been predicted to be $1.3 billion dollars instead of $598 million, or more than double the size. for the absence of graft, also has a positive coefficient in the regression, but it is not significant.
To save degrees of freedom at the country level we include only two macroeconomic variables, GDP and GDP per capita, in the baseline regressions and present robustness tests including additional macro variables below. We see that firms are significantly larger in larger and richer economies, consistent with the correlations reported in Table II . Turning to firm level controls, there is also a negative relation between the ratio of sales to net fixed assets (NSNFA) and firm size. This result coupled with the positive coefficient on GDP per capita suggest that higher capital intensity both at the firm and county level lead to larger firms. However, we do not see a significant relationship between firm size and the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets. Finally, we see a significant positive relationship between return on assets and firm size, indicating that more profitable firms tend to be larger. This result is consistent with the Lucas (1978) model in which more efficient firms become larger, although it may also indicate market power.
We next investigate the impact of both financial and legal development on firm size. Specifically, in Table IV , we add PRIVATE CREDIT to all the specifications with legal and institutional variables presented in Table III . Taken together, the results in this table show that both financial development and efficiency of legal enforcement lead to greater firm size. Thus, any advantage internal capital markets might have in allocating resources in countries with weak financial institutions and inefficient legal institutions is dominated by the inability of weak institutions to support and monitor large firms.
Insert Table IV here Table IV results also show that when controlling for financial development, the PROPERTY RIGHTS variable loses its significance. This result may be expected since financial development itself is likely to incorporate the effect of protection of property rights, lack of corruption and the like. We explore this possibility below.
Financial and Legal Institutions and Firm Size across Industries
In Table V, 
Insert Table V here
The results in Table V indicate that firms in industries with higher need for external financing are larger in countries with more developed financial systems. Also firms with a greater need for external finance tend to be larger where property rights are better protected. There is no significant interaction of external dependence with the legal efficiency variables. 16 We also find that firms in industries with a higher ratio of intangible to fixed assets are larger in countries with more developed financial systems, and less corruption.
Finally, external dependence and intangible intensity do not enter significantly by themselves in most specifications, indicating that industries characterized by greater dependence on external finance and higher intangible intensity do not have larger firms per se, but rather that financial development allows firms in these industries to grow to larger sizes. Overall, these results indicate that financial development fosters larger firms by allowing better access to external financing and by allowing firms a more efficient asset allocation. Further, better protection of property rights allows better access to external finance and lack of corruption fosters better asset allocation.
Robustness Checks
We next conduct a number of robustness checks of our results. Table VI shows the robustness of our main findings to controlling for other country characteristics that theory relates to firm size. Here we replicate our specifications in Table IV but introduce additional macroeconomic variables -INFLATION, OPENNESS, EDUCATION -to the baseline specifications. This is important since the variation in institutional variables is cross-country and not adequately controlling for other country specific variables may bias the results. We see that firms tend to be significantly larger in high inflation countries.
Further, firm size is smaller in economies that are more open to trade, which may indicate that openness hampers individual firms' market power. Finally, the education variable does not affect firm size in most of the specifications. Most importantly, controlling for these additional variables does not significantly change most of our results, although now the property rights variable is also highly significant and positive. This may be because the property rights variable attaches significant weight to the probability of expropriation of private property from the viewpoint of foreign investors, and is thus sensitive to controlling for the openness of the economy.
Insert Table VI here Table VII shows the robustness of our results to controlling for random countryeffects. This is an additional check to see if our results are sensitive to additional country level factors we may have omitted from the specifications. Table VII shows that this is not the case since our results are almost identical to those in Table IV when using random errors. Table VIII show, this correction does not change our results on PRIVATE CREDIT or legal efficiency variables significantly. In this specification CORRUPTION variable is also positive and highly significant, indicating that lack of corruption is correlated with larger firms once we account for the multicollinearity between private credit and corruption.
Insert
Insert Table VIII
In our analysis so far we have assumed that error terms are uncorrelated.
However, this may not be justified since firms in a country or industry may be subject to similar shocks that may not be captured by our control variables. Thus, in clustering or averaging at the country level.
Insert Table IX
Next, Table X shows that our main findings are robust to using an alternative indicator of firm size. Here, we use the U.S. dollar value of the firm's total assets as opposed to sales. The financial and legal efficiency results are not sensitive to using this alternative specification. Property rights coefficient is insignificant as in Table IV, yet the corruption variable which is particularly sensitive to the correlation with PRIVATE CREDIT is again negative but also significant.
Insert Table X here
In this paper we focus on the largest 100 firms in each country to explore firms' choice of size for a sample of firms that are least likely to be constrained in reaching their optimal size. As a final robustness test, we also replicate our results limiting the sample to the largest 25 firms in each country which are even less likely to be constrained in their growth. 
Conclusion
In this paper we examine the relationship between the development of a country's financial and legal institutions and the size of the largest firms in the country. Both firms'
internal capital markets and a country's financial institutions perform similar tasks in funding and monitoring investment projects. Thus, we expect that in countries with underdeveloped institutions, firms' internal capital markets substitute for external providers of capital. If this effect is significant, then we expect to observe that firms are larger in such countries. However, large firms concentrate financial power in the hands of corporate insiders who have an incentive to misappropriate the firm's assets. A sophisticated financial sector and an efficient legal system might be necessary to control such misappropriation. Without such controls, firms will not be able to obtain external financing and may remain small even if internal financial markets are more efficient than public financial markets. Hence, large firms may require strong external institutions.
To ensure that issues such as limited access to finance due to underdeveloped financial institutions and markets do not constrain firms from reaching their optimal size 26 and confound our results, we focus on the largest firms in each economy. Our empirical results indicate that firms are larger in countries with more developed financial sectors and efficient legal systems. Firm size increases with financial institution and stock market development. These effects persist even when we control for a large number of firm, industry and country characteristics and robustness tests. We also find that better protection of property rights and lack of corruption are associated with larger firm size although this finding is less robust.
Our results also indicate that firms in industries with higher need for external financing are larger in countries with more developed financial institutions and better protection of property rights. We also find that firms in industries with a naturally higher ratio of intangible to fixed assets are larger in countries with more developed financial institutions, and less corruption. This suggests that it is through access to external financing and a more efficient asset allocation that better developed financial systems allow a country's largest firms to attain a larger size. We do not find significant interaction terms between these industry variables and a country's legal institutions, leaving open how legal system effectiveness impacts firm size.
Overall, our results do not support the view that large firms with internal markets and hierarchies can compensate for the underdevelopment of financial and legal institutions or existence of corruption in a country. Rather, well-developed institutions are a pre-requisite for the development of large corporations. This finding holds for both financial and legal institutions. [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] . The variables are defined as follows: SALES ($) is total firm sales in billions of US $. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of U.S. dollars. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in thousands of US$. INFLATION is the log difference of the Consumer Price Indicator. OPENNESS is given by imports plus exports divided by GDP. EDUCATION is gross enrolment in secondary schools. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. MARKET CAPITALIZATION is stock market capitalization divided by GDP. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Table III Determinants of Firm Size
The regression estimated is SIZE = ∀ + ∃1 NFATA + ∃2 NSNFA +∃3 ROA +∃4GDP + ∃5GDP/CAP + ∃6PRIVATE CREDIT + ∃7MARKET CAP. + ∃8JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY+ ∃9 CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT + ∃10 CORRUPTION + ∃11 PROPERTY RIGHTS + ∃12 LEGAL FORMALISM. Dependent variable, SIZE, is given by the log of total sales of the firm in billions of US$. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of U.S. dollars. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US. Log values of GDP and GDP per capita are used. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. MARKET CAPITALIZATION is stock market capitalization divided by GDP. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. All variables are averaged over the sample period and regressions are estimated including industry dummy variables. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. *** , ** and * stand for significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. .
Table IV Determinants of Firm Size: Financial and Legal Institutions
The regression estimated is SIZE = ∀ + ∃1 NFATA + ∃2 NSNFA +∃3 ROA +∃4GDP + ∃5GDP/CAP + ∃6JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY + ∃7 CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT + ∃8 PRIVATE CREDIT+ ∃9 CORRUPTION+ ∃10 PROPERTY RIGHTS+ ∃11 LEGAL FORMALISM. Dependent variable, SIZE, is given by logarithm of total sales of the firm in billions of US$. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of US $. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US. Log values of GDP and GDP per capita are used. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. All variables are averaged over the sample period and regressions are estimated including industry dummy variables. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. 
Table V Impact of External Financing Need and Intangible Intensity
The regression estimated is SIZE = ∀ + ∃1 NFATA + ∃2 NSNFA +∃3 ROA +∃4GDP + ∃5GDP/CAP + ∃6EXTERNAL FINANCING + ∃7 INTANGIBLE INTENSITY + ∃8 PRIVATE CREDIT +∃9JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY+∃10 CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT+∃11 CORRUPTION+ ∃12 PROPERTY RIGHTS+∃13 FORMALISM +∃14EXTERNAL FINANCING x PRIVATE CREDIT or JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY or CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT or CORRUPTION or PROPERTY RIGHTS or FORMALISM +∃17 INTANGIBLE INTENSITY x PRIVATE CREDIT or JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY or CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT or CORRUPTION or PROPERTY RIGHTS or FORMALISM.. Dependent variable, SIZE, is given by the logarithm of total sales of the firm in billions of US$. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of US $. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US$. Log values of GDP and GDP per capita are used. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. EXTERNAL FINANCING is a measure of the dependence on external financing calculated at the two digit SIC level from Rajan and Zingales (1998) . INTANGIBLE INTENSITY is the ratio of intangibles to fixed assets calculated at the two digit SIC level from Laeven and Claessens (2003) . All variables are averaged over the sample period and regressions are estimated including industry dummy variables. Only selected coefficients are reported for brevity. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The regression estimated is SIZE = ∀ + ∃1 NFATA + ∃2 NSNFA +∃3 ROA +∃4GDP + ∃5GDP/CAP + ∃6JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY + ∃7 CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT + ∃8 PRIVATE CREDIT+ ∃9 CORRUPTION + ∃10 PROPERTY RIGHTS +∃11 LEGAL FORMALISM+∃12 INFLATION+∃14 3OPENNESS+∃14EDUCATION. Dependent variable, SIZE, is given by logarithm of total sales of the firm in billions of US$. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of U.S. dollars. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US. Log values of GDP and GDP per capita are used. $. INFLATION is the log difference of the Consumer Price Indicator. OPENNESS is given by imports plus exports divided by GDP. EDUCATION is gross enrolment in secondary schools. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. All variables are averaged over the sample period and regressions are estimated including industry dummy variables. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. The regression estimated is SIZE = ∀ + ∃1 NFATA + ∃2 NSNFA +∃3 ROA +∃4GDP + ∃5GDP/CAP + ∃6JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY + ∃7 CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT + ∃8 PRIVATE CREDIT+ ∃9 CORRUPTION+ ∃10 PROPERTY RIGHTS+ ∃11LEGAL FORMALISM. Dependent variable, SIZE, is given by logarithm of total sales of the firm in billions of US$. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of U.S. dollars. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US. Log values of GDP and GDP per capita are used. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. All variables are averaged over the sample period and regressions are estimated including industry dummy variables. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. The first stage regression is PRIVATE CREDIT=∀ + ∃1 GDP/CAP + ∃2 INFLATION +∃3 CREDITOR RIGHTS +∃4COMMON + ∃5FRENCH+ ∃6GERMAN+∃7 JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY/CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/CORRUPTION/PROPERTY RIGHTS/FORMALISM.. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US. CREDITOR RIGHTS, scored 0 to 4, is an index aggregating different creditor rights. INFLATION is the log difference of the Consumer Price Indicator. COMMON, FRENCH and GERMAN are legal origin dummies each taking the value 1 if the country is a Common law, French civil law or German civil law country respectively. The independent variables also include one of the following : JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. PRIVATE CREDIT is the predicted value of PRIVATE CREDIT from the first stage. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. The second stage regression estimated is SIZE = ∀ + ∃1 NFATA + ∃2 NSNFA +∃3 ROA +∃4GDP + ∃5GDP/CAP + ∃6Error(PRIVATE CREDIT) + ∃7 JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY/CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/CORRUPTION/PROPERTY RIGHTS/FORMALISM. Dependent variable, SIZE, is given by logarithm of total sales of the firm in billions of US$. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of US $. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US. Log values of GDP and GDP per capita are used. Error (PRIVATE CREDIT) are the residuals from the first stage with the relevant legal variable. All variables are averaged over the sample period and regressions are estimated including industry dummy variables. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. The regression estimated is SIZE = ∀ + ∃1 NFATA + ∃2 NSNFA +∃3 ROA +∃4GDP + ∃5GDP/CAP + ∃6 PRIVATE CREDIT + ∃7 JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY + ∃8 CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT + ∃9 LEGAL FORMALISM + ∃10 CORRUPTION +∃11 PROPERTY RIGHTS. Dependent variable, SIZE, is given by logarithm of total sales of the firm in billions of US$. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of U.S. dollars. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US. Log values of GDP and GDP per capita are used. $. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. Panels A and B are estimated clustering errors by country and industry, respectively. Panels C and D average observations at the country and industry level in each country. When estimating country level regressions, firm and other country level controls are left out to conserve degrees of freedom. Other regressions include all right hand side although they are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Table X Robustness: Alternative Size Definitions
The regression estimated is SIZE = ∀ + ∃1 NFATA + ∃2 NSNFA +∃3 ROA +∃4GDP + ∃5GDP/CAP + ∃6JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY + ∃7 CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT + ∃8 PRIVATE CREDIT+ ∃9 CORRUPTION+ ∃10 PROPERTY RIGHTS+ ∃11LEGAL FORMALISM. Dependent variable, SIZE, is given by total assets of the firm in billions of US$. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of U.S. dollars. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US. Log values of GDP and GDP per capita are used. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. All variables are averaged over the sample period and regressions are estimated including industry dummy variables. Standard errors are given in parentheses. In all specifications coefficients are multiplied by 10 6 . Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. The regression estimated is SIZE = ∀ + ∃1 NFATA + ∃2 NSNFA +∃3 ROA +∃4GDP + ∃5GDP/CAP + ∃6JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY + ∃7 CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT + ∃8 PRIVATE CREDIT+ ∃9 CORRUPTION+ ∃10 PROPERTY RIGHTS+ ∃11 LEGAL FORMALISM. Dependent variable, SIZE, is given by logarithm of total sales of the firm in billions of US$. The 25 largest firms from each country are included in the sample. NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of US $. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in US. Log values of GDP and GDP per capita are used. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY, scored 0 to 10, is a measure of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, with higher values indicating more efficiency. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT is a measure of contract efficiency and is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution. PRIVATE CREDIT is credit extended to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions, divided by GDP. CORRUPTION, scored 0 to 6, is an indicator of the level of corruption in the government. PROPERTY RIGHTS, scored 1 to 5 is a rating of property rights in each country. LEGAL FORMALISM, scored 1 to 7, is an overall indicator of formalism in commercial dispute resolution. All variables are averaged over the sample period and regressions are estimated including industry dummy variables. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT A measure of contract efficiency. It is the time in calendar days it takes for dispute resolution.
World Bank Doing Business Survey PRIVATE CREDIT {(0.5)*(F(t)/P_e(t) + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1))}/(GDP(t)/P_a(t)), where F is credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector (lines 22d ), GDP is line 99b, P_e is end-of period CPI (line 64) and P_a is the average CPI for the year.
IFS
MARKET CAPITALIZATION {(0.5)*(F(t)/P_e(t) + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1))}/(GDP(t)/P_a(t)), where F is the total value of outstanding shares, GDP is line 99b, P_e is end-of period CPI (line 64) and P_a is the average CPI for the year. PROPERTY RIGHTS A rating of property rights in each country, on a scale of 1 to 5. Higher score indicates more property rights protection. The score is based, broadly, on the degree of legal protection of private property, the probability that the government will expropriate private property, and the country's legal protection to private property. The original order of the index has been reversed for this study. Figure 1 . Sales (US$) is given by total sales of the largest 100 firms in manufacturing. The figure presents the average values in billions of US$ for firms in each country for 1988-1997. The countries are in descending order.
